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A Study of Confederate Cavalry
Historian David A. Powell argues that cavalry operations in the Western
Theater of the Civil War have not been studied as well as they deserve, and he
sets out to prove his point by writing a thorough examination of the Confederate
cavalry in the Chickamauga campaign. General Braxton Bragg’s Army of
Tennessee had a larger mounted contingent for this campaign, which played out
among the imposing mountains around Chattanooga during August and
September, 1863, than for any other time period in the history of that army. And
yet, as amply demonstrated by Powell, the gray-coated horsemen failed in many
ways to serve the needs of the major Rebel army in the West, contributing
greatly to Bragg’s failure to save Chattanooga despite a smashing defeat of
Major General William S. Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland on the field of
Chickamauga.
It is an interesting thesis. Powell argues that “miscues, mistakes, and
outright refusals to follow orders hamstrung the Rebels," contributed to
Rosecrans’ ability to flank Bragg out of Chattanooga, and hampered Bragg’s
ability to take the offensive against his foe in the days preceding the bloody
engagement at Chickamauga (xiii). These failures rested on the shoulders of
Bragg’s two cavalry commanders, Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest
and Major General Joseph Wheeler. These two men commanded a combined
mounted force of some 16,000 troopers, outnumbering Rosecrans’ available
cavalry force. Powell also assesses the accomplishments and errors of
subordinate Confederate cavalrymen, but this is primarily a command and
control study from the top down. He focuses most of his attention on Bragg,
Forrest, and Wheeler. Powell’s conclusion is that Bragg, who has received loads
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2011

1

Civil War Book Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 15

of criticism from historians for the loss of Chattanooga and for failing to reap
any real benefits from the costly victory at Chickamauga, does not deserve all of
that blame. He further argues, and amply proves his point by reference to the
Official Records and other primary sources, that both Forrest and Wheeler
deserve a great deal more blame for these failures than they have ever received.
As Powell rightfully acknowledges, blaming Forrest for failure is a risky
move within the context of the historiography. The subject of about a dozen
major studies over the decades, Forrest is worshipped by many southern
partisans as something slightly less than a martial god. In this area, more than in
any other, Powell’s book takes a much-needed departure from the prevailing
literature and offers us a balanced, reasonable, and accurate assessment of
Forrest as a military commander. Powell sees Forrest as primarily a raider who
excelled at independent operations behind enemy lines, a man unsuited and
ill-experienced to take on the role of a corps commander whose primary
responsibility was to orient his operations around the needs of a large infantry
force. As a result, Forrest’s role in the Chickamauga campaign was mixed. He
did some things well, but failed at many others through lack of experience at
those roles and through his impatience with his assignment. While Bragg began
the campaign with a high opinion of Forrest, by the end of it he was more than
ready to authorize his assignment elsewhere.
Powell is even more critical of Joseph Wheeler, in part because it is difficult
to figure out why the general was so reluctant to obey Bragg’s orders during the
campaign. Wheeler consistently ignored or only partially responded to Bragg’s
instructions about vigorous reconnaissance, arguing that his true role lay in
protecting vital supply lines. When he did send in intelligence reports, they often
were inaccurate or unhelpful. Yet, when it came time to re-organize his cavalry
arm after the campaign, Bragg kept Wheeler and enlarged his responsibilities.
While Powell is somewhat at a loss to explain this, ascribing it to Bragg’s loyalty
to Wheeler, a better explanation lies in Wheeler’s performance during the Stones
River campaign where the cavalry leader performed magnificently in supporting
Bragg’s defensive strategy near Murfreesboro. It is even possible that Wheeler’s
petulancy during the Chickamauga campaign may have stemmed from
suppressed anger over Bragg’s favoring of Forrest. At any rate, Wheeler had
already proven his ability to conduct mounted operations in support of a larger
infantry force, and would later continue to do so during the Atlanta campaign,
which is exactly what Bragg needed.
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Wheeler has been a controversial figure in Civil War historiography, and
whipping him once again will create only limited notice. But Powell may well be
the first historian to offer a thorough and accurate critique of Forrest as a
general. While he does not exonerate Bragg, Powell also offers a much-needed,
balanced view of his generalship.
In short, there is everything to praise in this book. In addition to the sound
research and welcome analysis, the fifteen maps are excellent. Powell includes
mini-biographies of all the major players in Bragg’s cavalry command and offers
astute analysis of the nature of his mounted force before the campaign began,
highlighting the problems of organization and the limitations among division and
brigade commanders. His driving tour of cavalry sites associated with the
Chickamauga campaign is superb, and his epilogue discussing how other
historians have evaluated Bragg, Forrest, and Wheeler in the campaign is also
very interesting.
My criticisms of the book are minor and few. Powell often mixes present
tense with past tense, writing his mini-biographies and map captions in the
former while the major text of the book is mostly in past tense. I say mostly
because he sometimes slips from one tense to the other within the same
paragraph. There also are more grammatical and typographical errors than there
ought to be, all of which indicates that copyediting may have been slack on this
project. But these small quibbles are more than balanced out by the consistently
high standards imparted their books by the team of Savas and Beatie. This is a
handsome product with strong binding and good paper.
Powell’s book deserves wide consideration as a new look at topics encrusted
with old ideas. I hope it will spark interest in similar studies of other western
campaigns so that this somewhat neglected theater of operations will catch up
with the Virginia theater, where historians such as Eric J. Wittenberg have been
producing important studies of cavalry operations for some time now. Students
of the Western Theater need a fresh look at the role played by both the Union
and Confederate mounted arm in this sprawling, geographically diverse region of
the Civil War.
Earl J. Hess is Stewart W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln
Memorial University, Harrogate, Tennessee. He is the author of more than a
dozen books on Civil War military history, the latest being Into the Crater—The
Mine Attack at Petersburg (University of South Carolina Press, 2010).
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